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HUDSON v. MCMILLIAN AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN THE
1990s: IS THE SUPREME COURT NOW MORE RESPONSIVE TO
"CONTEMPORANEOUS STANDARDS OF DECENCY"?1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits, among other things, "cruel and un-
usual punishment."2 In the prison context, the United States Supreme
Court historically applied this clause solely to protect prisoners from un-
fair sentences.3 It was not until 1976, 185 years after the adoption of the
Eighth Amendment that the Supreme Court found cruel and unusual
punishment protections to apply to events or conditions experienced by
prisoners during incarceration. 4 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court granted
Eighth Amendment protections to a prisoner alleging deprivations during
imprisonment.5 After 1976, the Court seemed to move away from the
"hands-off' doctrine,6 which traditionally granted deference to prison of-
ficials, and began to recognize more rigid standards controlling the con-
duct of prison officials in an effort to protect prisoners' rights.7 However,
with the emergence of the Rehnquist Court, prisoners began to see the
erosion of some of their newfound protections, primarily by two deci-
sions." The Court's recent decision in Hudson v . McMillian is a signifi-
cant victory for prisoner's rights, and an indication that the present Court
is not completely willing to adopt the hands-off doctrine.
While the Hudson decision preserved the subjective element of the
Eighth Amendment's test for cruel and unusual punishment claims, the
1. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
3. See Hudson v. McMiUian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
4. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005-06 (Thomas, J.; dissenting). The Eighth Amendment
was used primarily to protect against punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. See
e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1973) (joint opinion); Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. See
generally JAMES J. GOBERT & NEro P. COHEN, Rights of Prisoners (1981).
5. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
6. The hands-off doctrine provides that "[clourts are without power to supervise prison
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations." Banning v.
Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); see also Kenneth C.
Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the
"Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C. L. REv. 795.
7. See e.g., The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 235-36
(1991); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-06 (1974) (furthering the proposition that
the hands-off doctrine is inappropriate "[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a
fundamental constitutional guarantee"), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Ab-
bott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
8. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
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Court abandoned the objective component of the test, which formerly re-
quired that a claimant prove "serious injury" before a constitutional vio-
lation could be found." However, the remaining subjective element of the
test for excessive force cases could still pose problems for prisoners who
are disciplined unnecessarily. In fact, prisoners who are beaten in situa-
tions where force was unnecessary now are faced with the burden of prov-
ing that a prison official acted "maliciously and sadistically with the in-
tent to cause harm."' 0 Despite the Court's adherence to the subjective
standard, the Hudson decision signals that the Eighth Amendment is a
dynamic, evolving area of the law which affords prisoners who have been
disciplined with excessive force greater protection than ever. This Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence comes as a surprise since the Rehnquist Court
has typically been a steadfast opponent of prisoners' rights. Perhaps even
more eye opening, however, was the dissent written by recently appointed
Justice Thomas and joined only by Justice Scalia, which aggressively at-
tacked the majority's rejection of the serious injury requirement."
This Casenote, while primarily focusing on Hudson, also discusses the
precedent which Hudson followed as well as what the future may hold for
prisoners' rights in the United States in light of this decision. Specifically,
Part II examines the history of the Eighth Amendment and its treatment
by the Supreme Court in relation to prisoners' rights.12 Part III examines
how the Whitley v. Albers" and Wilson v. Seiter14 decisions restricted
prisoners' rights under the Eighth Amendment. Part IV analyzes the
lower federal courts' treatment of Hudson as well as the Supreme Court's
ruling.'5 Finally, Part V predicts the effect that Hudson will have on pris-
oners and prison officials.' 6 Generally, this Casenote argues that the Hud-
son opinion is an important step by the Court toward protecting prison-
ers' rights but that, at the same time, the Court still applies an
inappropriate standard to excessive force cases.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Traditionally, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment was applied only to sentences imposed by federal
judges. 17 However, the Supreme Court gradually recognized that the
9. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
10. Id. at 999.
11. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1007-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. See infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 77-126 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 127-164 and accompanying text.
17. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (reviewing the framers' intent and the history of the
Eighth Amendment). One author has stated that the reasons for applying the Eighth
[Vol. 27:151152
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Eighth Amendment is not a static safeguard, but "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society."18 It decided in 1962 that the Eighth Amendment should
apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 In Robinson v. California, the Court invalidated a Califor-
nia statute which made narcotic addiction a criminal offense.20 Despite
recognizing a state's interest in monitoring narcotic drug traffic, the
Court, which categorized drug addiction with other diseases, found that
the statute was comparable to a law which punished a person for being
mentally ill. 21 The Court added that "in the light of contemporary human
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be . . . unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
22
In 1976, for the first time, the Court applied its Eighth Amendment
analysis to deprivations that were not part of a criminal sentence, but
nonetheless were suffered by prisoners while incarcerated.23 In Estelle v.
Gamble, the Court created a standard making unconstitutional "acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to seri-
ous medical needs."'24 J.W. Gamble, a Texas inmate, injured his back
while performing a prison work assignment 25 and filed a section 1983 ac-
tion alleging that the medical treatment he received following his injury
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and un-
usual punishment.26 The Court acknowledged that the government has an
implicit obligation to provide medical care to inmates.27 In Gamble's situ-
Amendment to prison sentences and not to conditions within prisons were: "(1) Lack of
judicial expertise in the correction area, (2) lack of adequate judicial remedies, and (3) the
belief that conditions of confinement involved privileges rather than rights and therefore
were not subject to judicial scrutiny." James E. Robertson, When the Supreme Court Com-
mands, Do the Lower Federal Courts Obey?: The Impact of Rhodes v. Chapman on Correc-
tional Litigation, 7 HAALINE L. RE V. 79, 79 & n.3 (1984). See generally GOBERT & COHEN,
supra note 4.
18. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
19. 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
20. Id. at 667.
21. Id. at 666.
22. Id.
23. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prior to Estelle, the Court extended constitu-
tional protection to prisoners through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See e.g. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
24. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The Court equated deliberate indifference to a prisoner's
serious medical needs to the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard promul-
gated in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion). Id. at 104. The Court has
recognized that the "deliberate indifference" standard is a lesser standard than express in-
tent. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
25. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99.
26. Id. at 101.
27. Id. at 103. The Court drew this conclusion after relying primarily on language from
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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ation, prison doctors concluded that his injury was a lower back strain
and recommended bed rest and medication.28 The Court found that while
prison officials may have failed to properly diagnose and treat Gamble's
injury, their conduct did not evince a deliberate indifference to Gamble's
condition, thereby falling short of an Eighth Amendment violation.2 De-
spite this finding, the Court displayed new concerns over the treatment of
prisoners during incarceration.
Five years later, in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court reiterated part of
the test created in Estelle, requiring the plaintiff, who alleged that
double-celling was a constitutional violation, to demonstrate objective
harm (serious injury) before receiving relief under the Eighth Amend-
ment.30 An Ohio inmate, Kelly Chapman, was held, along with another
inmate, in a cell which measured approximately sixty-three square feet.31
While the prisoners were double-celled, they were not deprived of "essen-
tial food, medical care, or sanitation" 2 or other basic needs. The Court,
in keeping with Estelle, acknowledged that substandard prison conditions
can rise to an Eighth Amendment violation if they do not comport with
"contemporary standard[s] of decency." 33 However, in reversing both of
the lower courts, the Court found that Chapman's allegations failed to
prove that double-celling "inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is
grossly disproportionate to the severity of crimes warranting imprison-
ment." s4 In discussing what constitutes serious injury, the Court empha-
sized that "[t]o the extent that such conditions are restrictive or even
harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society."3 5 While maintaining the serious injury require-
ment, the Court stated that the Eighth Amendment should be inter-
preted "in a flexible and dynamic manner. 3 6
While Estelle and Rhodes established standards designed to protect
the rights of prisoners, the Court continued to defer to prison officials
after these decisions. As the Court backed away from the "hands-off"
doctrine by not deferring completely to state prison administrators, it ap-
peared that the Court's newly created standards had peculiarly the same
effects. After Rhodes, in order to show a constitutional violation in depri-
28. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99.
29. Id. at 107.
30. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Court never discussed the states of mind of the prison offi-
cials because the plaintiff failed to show first that he sustained serious injury. Id. at 348.
The two elements of the test were not labeled objective and subjective until 1991. See Wil-
son v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
31. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 341.
32. Id. at 348.
33. Id. at 347.
34. Id. at 348.
35. Id. at 347.
36. Id. at 345 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion)).
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vation cases, prisoners needed to demonstrate first, a serious injury and
second, that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference.3 7 Al-
though the language of contemporaneous standards of decency became
the recurring theme, the Court refused to substitute its judgment for that
of prison officials.38 Despite claiming that "[t]here is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,"3 9 the
Court, after creating limited exceptions in Estelle and Rhodes, still al-
lowed the administration of the country's prisons to lie firmly in the
hands of prison officials.
III. MORE STRINGENT STANDARDS: PRISONERS' RIGHTS AFTER WHITLEY
AND WILSON
Any support that was exhibited by the Court for prisoners' rights cases
during the 1970s and early 1980s was significantly curtailed by an increas-
ingly conservative Court. Bolstered by the addition of Justice O'Connor
in 1981, the Court undertook efforts to define more precisely the rights of
prisoners in an area of law where litigation was rapidly increasing.4 ° Al-
though both parts of the test were reviewed, the Court seemed more criti-
cal of the subjective element since several Justices openly supported great
deference to the administrative judgment of prison officials.41
A. Whitley v. Albers
In 1986, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court decided
Whitley v. Albers.4 2 In 1980, Gerald Albers was confined to an Oregon
state penitentiary when several prisoners became upset over the treat-
37. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
38. This attitude was displayed by Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Bell v.
Wolfish:
In determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the gov-
ernment's interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in
a manageable fashion, courts must heed our warning that "[s]uch considerations are
peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and,
in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have
exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to
their expert judgment in such matters."
441 U.S. 520, 540-41 n.23 (1979) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
39. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
40. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353-54 nn.l-2 (Brennan, J. concurring).
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Joining Justice Rehnquist in his majority
opinion in Bell v. Wolfish were Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun as well as Chief
Justice Burger.
42. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). The Court asserted in Whitley that claims challenging excessive
force must be brought under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 327. However, there are occa-
sions when substantive due process challenges are proper. See, e.g. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979) (holding that pretrial detainees are constitutionally protected from punishment).
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ment of several intoxicated inmates by prison guards.43 A guard was
taken hostage" before officials determined that direct armed intervention
was required to restore order.45 Guards fired several warning shots and
then began firing on prisoners whom the guards believed were trying to
escape to other areas of the prison.48 Albers was shot in the left knee as
he tried to flee up a flight of stairs.
4 7
The Court mandated that prisoners, in order to show an Eighth
Amendment violation during prison riot situations, must prove that force
was not used in good faith but was applied "maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm. '48 The Court added that "[ult is
obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establish-
ing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring offi-
cial control over a tumultuous cellblock.' 4 The Court further noted that
"such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used, [and] the extent
of the injury inflicted" should be considered in evaluating a prison offi-
cial's conduct. 50 After considering such factors, "inferences may be drawn
as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought neces-
sary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified
infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it oc-
cur.' 1 In addition, the Court noted that Eighth Amendment claims
should be evaluated contextually "with due regard for differences in con-
duct.' 52 Specifically, the Whitley Court determined that the prison
guard's firing on the prisoner during the riot was made in a good faith
effort to quell the disturbance and therefore did not violate the prisoner's
43. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314.
44. Id. at 314-15.
45. Id. at 316.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). The standard enunciated in John-
son and applied in Whitley makes the prison official's subjective state of mind a controlling
issue when excessive force is alleged. In Graham v. Connor, the Court stated:
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals suggestion ... that the "malicious and
sadistic" inquiry is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively un-
reasonable under the circumstances. Whatever the empirical correlations between
"malicious and sadistic" behavior and objective unreasonableness may be, the fact
remains that the "malicious and sadistic" factor puts in issue the subjective motiva-
tions of the individual officers ....
490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
49. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
50. Id. at 321 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).
51. Id. (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)).
52. Id. at 320.
[Vol. 27:151
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Eighth Amendment rights.5" This finding was made despite evidence
which indicated that the prisoner was unarmed and not directly involved
in the disturbance.'
The standard created in Whitley was tailored specifically to an exces-
sive force case, while prior Supreme Court applications of the Eighth
Amendment concerned deprivation cases. In his dissent in Whitley, Jus-
tice Marshall, joined by three other justices, argued that a riot situation
should not "lessen the constraints imposed upon prison authorities by the
Eighth Amendment."5 5 Marshall commented that Estelle rejected "ex-
press intent" as a requirement for Eighth Amendment claims, and that
the majority essentially reinstated the express intent standard when re-
quiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that force was applied "maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." 56 Marshall be-
lieved that the proper standard to apply in excessive force cases was the
"unnecessary and wanton" standard, "which establishes a high hurdle to
be overcome by a prisoner seeking relief for a constitutional violation. '57
Marshall felt the "malicious and sadistic intent" test, which is to be ap-
plied only when a disturbance "poses significant risks," required lower
courts to make factual determinations typically reserved for juries.5 8
B. Wilson v. Seiter
In 1991, in Wilson v. Seiter, the United States Supreme Court applied
the deliberate indifference test formulated in Estelle to allegations made
by a prisoner complaining of substandard confinement conditions in an
Ohio prison.59 The prisoner alleged, among other things, overcrowding,
unsanitary conditions and inadequate heating and cooling." In adopting
the deliberate indifference standard, the Court rejected the lower court's
application of the Whitley test.6 1 The Court insisted that "some mental
element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify"62
as an Eighth Amendment violation. In addition to this subjective ele-
ment, the Court required the plaintiff to demonstrate objectively a "suffi-
ciently serious deprivation" before receiving relief under the Eighth
Amendment." Thus, Wilson was the Court's first decision where the
53. Id. at 326.
54. Id. at 332 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 328.
56. Id. at 328-29.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Id.
59. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
60. Id. at 2323.
61. Id. at 2328.
62. Id. at 2325.
63. Id. at 2324.
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claimant was required to prove objective harm and subjective intent to
successfully litigate an Eighth Amendment claim.
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens,
concurred in the judgment but criticized the majority for adopting the
deliberate indifference test.6 4 White argued that in prior deprivation
cases, such as Estelle and Rhodes, the Court determined that the denial
of a basic human need should be a Constitutional violation."5 White
added that the deliberate indifference standard was pulled by the major-
ity from dictum in the Whitley decision, an excessive force case, and was
inappropriate to a deprivation case.6" The concurrence observed that a
prisoner could have a very difficult time proving intent because prison
administration is often not at the direction of one person. 7 Justice White
also suggested that as a result of the Court's decision requiring a showing
of deliberate indifference, prison officials may now plead insufficient
funding as a valid defense to Eighth Amendment challenges regarding
substandard prison conditions. 8
Whitley and Wilson appear to have been a retreat by the Court as to
the rights of prisoners, allowing prison officials to act, in certain situa-
tions solely as they see fit. Commentators have criticized the decisions as
reversions to the "hands-off" doctrine.6 9 The holding in Whitley was an
effort by the Court to defer to prison officials who, when faced with riot-
ous situations, often must make split second decisions which may affect
the lives of guards, prisoners and perhaps even third parties.70 Now, a
guard who believes he is acting in good faith to halt a riot may proceed at
his own discretion."' According to Wilson, a similar burden is placed on
prisoners who allege substandard prison conditions. The Wilson test re-
quires a prisoner to show that a prison official acted not only in bad faith,
but with a deliberate indifference to his welfare.7 2 The standard dictated
in Wilson puts the plaintiff in a difficult evidentiary position.73 Addition-
64. Id. at 2328-31 (White, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 2329.
66. Id. at 2330.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2330-31 (White, J., concurring).
69. See Elizabeth A. Blackburn, Prisoner's Rights: Will They Remain Protected After
Whitley?, 17 STETSON L. REV. 385, 387 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading
Cases, supra note 7, at 235.
70. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986).
71. The Whitley decision has led one author to say, "[i]f there is a disturbance, prisoners
beware." Blackburn, supra note 69, at 405.
72. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (1991); see Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d
645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) ("The infliction of punishment is
a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.... [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on [a]
prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like the
accepted meaning of the word.").
73. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (White, J., concurring).
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ally, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Wilson partially collapses the
distinction between cases involving specific acts of force and cases involv-
ing insufficient prison conditions. Realistically, a prison official's culpable
state of mind is a requisite element of proof for both types of cases.
After Whitley and Wilson, prisoners who alleged constitutional viola-
tions under the Eighth Amendment were faced with satisfying a difficult
test. First, under the objective element of the test that emerged from
Rhodes and Wilson, the prisoner was required to prove that he or she
suffered serious injury. The Court made it clear that double-ceiling, un-
sanitary eating conditions and inadequate heating and cooling were not
sufficiently serious injuries to give rise to an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion. The rationale supporting this requirement was that prisons are not
in the business of providing comfort for inmates, and only when a "mini-
mal civilized measure of life's necessities" is denied will a serious depriva-
tion be found.7 4 Second, under the subjective element of the test, which
emerged from Estelle, Rhodes, Whitley and Wilson, a prisoner must
demonstrate that a prison official, in the infliction of serious injury upon
the prisoner, acted with some culpable state of mind or wantonness. In
Whitley, the Court established that in order to show the requisite wan-
tonness in excessive force cases, a claimant must prove that the prison
official acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. In Wilson, the
Court followed Estelle and Rhodes by requiring a prisoner to show that
the prison guard acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's basic
human needs before meeting the subjective element of the test.
Thus, by 1992, a year after Wilson and sixteen years following Estelle,
the Eighth Amendment had weathered a flurry of litigation before an ac-
tive Supreme Court. While the Eighth Amendment was evolving during
this time, in reality the Court had strictly defined what constituted an
Eighth Amendment violation, thereby limiting successful claims brought
by prisoners to a scant few. Indeed, all four of the prisoners in Estelle,
Rhodes, Whitley and Wilson saw their claims lost before the Supreme
Court. Now the Court, with the two-part test firmly in place, had placed
high hurdles in the paths of prisoners who believed their constitutional
rights had been infringed. Estelle and Rhodes were hailed as victories for
prisoners' rights. However, Whitley and Wilson signaled that the Court
was returning to the days of deferring to prison officials, refusing to be-
come too involved in what the Rehnquist Court perceived as being a state
interest.75 Especially after Wilson, the Court seemed to have a strict ide-
ology in place that was particularly harsh on prisoners. With the addition
of Justice Thomas in 1991, the question remained if the Court would re-
74. Id. at 2324 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
75. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) ("The federal courts do not sit to
supervise state prisons, the administration of which is of acute interest to the States.").
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verse its trend or whether the Eighth Amendment was doomed as a static,
weak safeguard of the rights of our country's prisoners.
IV. HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN
Hudson v. McMillian"8 proved to be the case that pulled the Court out
of its standstill. With the abandonment of the objective component of its
test for excessive force cases, the Court appeared to recognize that prison-
ers' rights should be afforded greater protection, particularly when a pris-
oner is needlessly beaten by prison officials. What is interesting is that
the Court modified the test despite a scathing dissent by Justice Thomas.
Perhaps it was the utter cruelty and outright disregard for human dignity
demonstrated by three Louisiana prison guards which caught the Court's
attention."
A. The Lower Courts
On October 30, 1983, three prison guards took Keith Hudson from his
cell in Louisiana's Angola Prison to an administrative lockdown area."8
While en route, Hudson and Jack McMillian, a corrections officer, en-
gaged in an argument.78 McMillian responded by beating Hudson "in the
mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach while [Marvin] Woods [another correc-
tions officer] held him."8 Woods then kicked Hudson.8' Arthur Mezo, the
correction officers' supervisor, who witnessed the incident but did not
participate in the beating, merely cautioned the guards not to "have too
much fun."8' As a result of the beating, Hudson suffered bruises, loosened
teeth and a cracked dental plate.8
Hudson subsequently filed a section 1983 action against the guards, al-
leging that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated."' A Louisi-
ana district court found for Hudson, concluding that "defendants Woods
76. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
77. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
78. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
79. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1014. Section 1983, which provides a civil action for deprivation of rights, states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
[Vol. 27:151160
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and McMillian used force on the plaintiff when there was no need."8 5 The
district court made its ruling despite finding that Hudson's injuries were
only minor.86 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court that unnecessary force on prisoners is deplorable.8 7 Nevertheless it
reversed, holding Hudson had not met the requirements set out in its
earlier decision of Huguet v. Barnett.8 8 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
stated that Hudson's claim did not meet the "significant injury" require-
ment since the district court had found Hudson's injuries to be minor.8 9
The court seemed unmoved by the fact that the force was "objectively
unreasonable."' 0
B. The Supreme Court
1. The Majority
On the heels of the Wilson decision, an increasingly conservative Su-
preme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.91 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor,
who wrote the Whitley opinion, also delivered the opinion of the Court in
Hudson.9 2 In finding for Hudson, the Court drew two significant
conclusions.
First, the Court adopted the "maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm" standard set out in Whitley for all Eighth Amendment excessive
force claims.9 3 In adopting this subjective standard, the Court stated that
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain is expressly forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment.4 However, what is required to show unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain varies according to the "nature of the al-
leged constitutional violation."9' 5 Citing Whitley, the Court stated that of-
85. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990)). In Huguet, the Fifth
Circuit established that the following four requirements must be met in excessive force
cases: "1. a significant injury, which, 2. resulted directly and only from the use of force that
was clearly excessive to the need, the excessiveness of which was, 3. objectively unreasona-
ble, and, 4. the action constituted an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Huguet,
900 F.2d at 841.
89. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015.
90. Id. ("Hudson's claim ... founders on the significant injury prong.").
91. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 999. The Court stated its holding as follows:
[W]e hold that whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical
force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial
inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
Id.
94. Id. at 998.
95. Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
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ficials who are confronted with prison disturbances must "balance the
threat unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visi-
tors against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force." 96 The
Court then discussed the concerns enumerated in Whitley.9 7 Those con-
cerns included balancing the need for discipline against the risk of injury
to inmates and the importance of affording proper deference to prison
officials so that they may execute policies that are needed to maintain
discipline and security."'
The Court believed that these administrative concerns exist at times of
prison unrest or whenever force is used to discipline prisoners.9 Since
similar concerns exist at times of riot and at other times when discipli-
nary force is applied, the Court found it could extend the Whitley stan-
dard to all excessive force cases. The Court felt the extension of Whitley
was not a tremendous leap since numerous lower federal courts had previ-
ously applied it to non-riot situations.100 The Court added that the deter-
mination of whether or not disciplinary conduct was unnecessary depends
on the balancing of the concerns outlined in Whitley.10 Those factors
include "the need for application of force, the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used, the threat 'reasonably perceived by
the responsible officials,' and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response.' "o102
The Court's second conclusion was that a plaintiff need not suffer a
serious injury at the hands of a prison official to recover under the Eighth
Amendment.10 3 The Court stated that whether a serious injury was sus-
tained is relevant to Eighth Amendment violations but is not the linch-
pin."" The objective component of an Eighth Amendment inquiry must
be based on "'differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth
Amendment objection is lodged.' "105 In revisiting Estelle, Rhodes and
Whitley, the Court argued that the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim is defined by the situation.108 For instance, the Court
asserted that medical needs and substandard conditions in prisons must
rise to the level of extreme deprivation to satisfy an Eighth Amendment
96. Id.
97. Id. at 999.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 998-99.
100. Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
103. Id. at 1000.
104. See id.
105. Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). The Court repeated that
the Eighth Amendment "'draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.' "Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))).
106. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
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claim because physical comfort and unqualified health care are not part
and parcel of prison life. 207 The Court found that excessive force cases are
different."0 8 Whenever force is used maliciously and sadistically to cause
injury, society's expectations concerning decent treatment of prisoners
are offended.109 Still, the amount of force used remains a factor the Court
must evaluate because "[t]he Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel
and unusual' punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recog-
nition de minimis uses of physical force. . . ."0 Anticipating criticism
concerning its rejectioii of the serious injury rule, the Court took issue
with the dissent's failure to accept differences -between physical abuse of
a prisoner and substandard conditions in a prison.111 Thus, the Court re-
jected the serious injury requirement for excessive force cases claiming
that it did not comport with contemporary standards of decency.12
2. The Dissent
In his controversial dissent, Justice Thomas criticized the Court for its
rejection of the serious injury requirement. 3 He first engaged in a
lengthy discourse, discussing the historical applications of the Eighth
Amendment to "torturous punishments meted out by statutes or sentenc-
ing judges, and not generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner
during incarceration.1' 4 Justice Thomas also noted that it was not until
Estelle that the Court first agreed to apply the Eighth Amendment to
deprivation cases.115 Justice Thomas concluded that the Court made a
monumental mistake when it "cut the Eighth Amendment loose from its
historical moorings."'1 6 He pointed out that the Court in Estelle, Rhodes
and Wilson held in each instance that the prisoner must allege a serious
injury before recovering under an Eighth Amendment claim." 7 Given this
precedent, Thomas argued, the Court had no business dismissing the seri-
ous injury rule.' He claimed that the objective component of Whitley is
not contextual, but rather it is the "culpability of an official's state of
mind [which] depends on the context in which he acts."'1
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
111. Id. at 1001.
112. Id. at 999-1001.
113. Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1005.
115. Id. at 1006.
116. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1007-08. -
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Justice Thomas was also concerned that the majority was unjustifiably
using Hudson as an extension of the Whitley standard to all excessive
force cases. 20 He supposed that the rejection of the objective component
in excessive force cases is now compensated for by a stricter requirement
in the subjective component. 21 Thomas disagreed with the application of
Whitley, arguing that in some excessive force cases "no competing insti-
tutional concerns are present" and use of excessive physical force is not
always accompanied by a "malicious and sadistic" state of mind.1 22
Additionally, Justice Thomas found fault with the Court's distinguish-
ing Estelle. 1 s He wondered why the Court would require injury to be
serious for deprivation cases but not for excessive force cases.1 24 After all,
Thomas supposed, society does not expect prisoners to be comfortable at
all times and likewise to be free from occasional force, "since forcibly
keeping prisoners in detention is what prisons are all about.""'
V. WHAT HAPPENS TO PRISoNER's RIGHTS IN THE 1990s?
In deprivation cases such as Estelle, Rhodes and Wilson, both the ob-
jective and subjective elements of the Eighth Amendment test must still
be proved. This remains true despite the holding in Hudson. However, for
excessive force cases, the Court's rejection of the serious injury rule is a
step in the right direction.' 6 The Court has indicated that unnecessary
and wanton acts of violence directed at prisoners should not be a compo-
nent of prison life. Importantly, the "contemporary standards of decency"
phrase has new meaning.117 Rejection of the serious injury rule also dis-
solves the argument over what is and what is not a "serious" injury."5s
Prisoners may now allege constitutional violations involving force which
caused severe pain but did not cause permanent or significant injury. Fur-
120. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Several commentators have applauded the Court's decision to abandon the serious
injury rule while criticizing Thomas's dissent. See Eric Neisser, 'Kind and Unusual Punish-
ment' Revisited, N.J. L.J., March 30, 1992, at 21; Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beating
Case, N.Y. L.J., April 21, 1992, at 3; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Thomas Strikes Cruel and
Unusual Pose, N.J. L.J., March 16, 1992, at 16.
127. See Schwartz, supra note 126, at 7.
128. See Adams v. Hansen, 906 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1990) (lacerated fingers consti-
tuted significant injury); Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 309 (1990) (no significant physical injury when a police officer placed a
gun in the mouth of the plaintiff and threatened to blow his head off); Brown v. Glossip, 878
F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1989) (arm injury requiring surgery and resulting in loss of earning
capacity constituted severe injury).
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thermore, psychological injuries may be within the realm of Eighth
Amendment claims, if they are caused maliciously and sadistically.1 2 9
Already the Hudson opinion appears to have protected another Louisi-
ana inmate. In Flowers v. Phelps,5 0 Alfred Flowers, an inmate at Angola
prison (the same prison where Keith Hudson was detained) was hand-
cuffed at the hands and legs and then beaten in an unprovoked attack. 131
He suffered swelling in his ankle and abrasions.1 2 The district court
found for Flowers because the force used was deliberate and unneces-
sary.13 The Fifth Circuit, this time bound by Hudson and not by Huguet,
affirmed the district court's finding that "there is no degree-of-injury
threshold for Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force." 134
Without the serious injury requirement, one would think it would be
easier for prisoners such as Flowers to successfully litigate excessive force
cases. Indeed, recognizing that the elimination of the serious injury re-
quirement will, in all likelihood, lead to an increase in the filing of exces-
sive force claims, several states filed amicus curiae briefs in Hudson argu-
ing that the serious injury requirement has merit.13 5 In his concurrence,
however, Justice Blackmun stated that caseload concerns have no place in
evaluating Eighth Amendment claims.138 Blackmun argued that concern
over an increase in the federal docket is inappropriate where an individ-
ual's substantive constitutional rights are at stake.1 37 Although Justice
Blackmun is philosophically correct, the reality is that federal judges may
view the influx of excessive force cases with skepticism, and consequently
could make it more difficult for prisoners to satisfy the requisite intent
threshold. After all, it was the distinction between non-serious injury and
serious injury cases which allowed the federal bench to lighten its
caseload in the past by eliminating "frivolous" claims. It is submitted
that cases which may have met the serious injury requirement in the past
may now be jeopardized if the federal bench subversively limits its
caseload by imposing stricter intent requirements.
In addition, courts may, as one federal district court has done, avoid
the Hudson analysis altogether by classifying the force as de minimis. In
129. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992); id. at 1002-03 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
130. 956 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 489.
132. Id. at 489-90.
133. Id. at 491.
134. Id.
135. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. One commentator has argued that Hudson is an unjustifiable expansion of pris-
oners' rights and will initially lead to an increase in frivolous claims filed by prisoners in the
federal court system. See Gregory P. Taxin, The Eighth Amendment in Section 1983 Cases:
Hudson v. McMillian, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1050 (1992).
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Candelaria v. Coughlin,'5s Juan Candelaria, a former New York state in-
mate, alleged that he was assaulted unnecessarily when a guard cut a
string from around the claimant's neck in order to remove an identifica-
tion card. The prisoner alleged that when he tried to remove the card
himself, the guard pushed his fist against the prisoner's neck causing the
prisoner to have difficulty breathing.3 9 The district court found no
Eighth Amendment violation because the force was de minimis.1°0 The
court based its conclusion on the fact that a physician's assistant who
examined the prisoner found no "redness, bruising, swelling or other indi-
cation of physical injury to his ears or neck." 4 The court made no men-
tion of whether the force was necessary or the intent of the guard. The
court also seemed unconcerned with the possibility that air flow through
the prisoner's throat may have been cut off. In Hudson, the Court dic-
tated that de minimis force would not constitute an Eighth Amendment
violation unless the force was "'repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind.' "142 Suppose a prison guard choked a prisoner unnecessarily five
seconds from his death without leaving any major physical marks on the
prisoner. Would that be conduct which is "repugnant to the conscience of
mankind"? What we may see from courts, such as the one in Candelaria,
is a tendency to throw out cases when only de minimis injury is demon-
strated, thereby putting a new premium on what is and what is not de
minimis injury.
The extension of the Whitley malicious and sadistic test to all excessive
force cases should clear up some of the confusion the lower federal courts
had concerning the appropriate instances in which to apply Whitley.'"
Less clear is why Whitley itself was extended when it was significantly
narrow in scope.24 4 What is also troubling about the application of the
malicious and sadistic test is that Whitley was a five to four vote, indicat-
ing that the test was highly contested and stands on somewhat unstable
138. 787 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
139. Id. at 371.
140. Id. at 375.
141. Id. at 374-75.
142. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
143. See AI-Jundi v. Mancusi, 926 F.2d 235, 239-40 (2nd Cir. 1991) (applying Whitley
standard during riotous circumstances, but the deliberate indifference standard once order
had been restored); Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1316 (4th Cir. 1991) (inmate's
stabbing by a fellow inmate governed by the Whitley standard, but the dissent argued that
Whitley is limited to riotous situations); Wyatt v. Delaney, 818 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1987)
(finding that when the case does not involve a prison security measure to resolve distur-
bance, Court should not apply malice factor).
144. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 314 (1986) ("This case requires us to decide
what standard governs a prison inmates' claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to quell a
prison riot.").
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ground.14 5 The Whitley test makes sense in situations such as riots where
violent force directed at inmates may be appropriate to quell the distur-
bance. Still, force violates a prisoner's constitutional safeguards when it is
applied unnecessarily and with the intent to cause harm.146 But why
should there be a subjective requirement (culpable state of mind) when,
in a non-riotous situation, force was unnecessary from the outset? With
Hudson, the Court has placed the burden on a plaintiff to show why a
prison official acted in an uncalled for manner regardless of the official's
state of mind. Basically, the Court still believes that some deference
should be afforded to a prison official's state of mind in the cruel and
unusual standard.
It is unclear how onerous a burden now faces a plaintiff when he or she
attempts to show a prison official's culpable state of mind. An intentional
act, such as the beating administered to Hudson, will meet the threshold
requirement.1 47 More insular, discreet acts could pose problems for pris-
oners who assert that their Eighth Amendment rights have been violated.
Will mistake or negligence be punishable under Eighth Amendment safe-
guards? Certainly, the intent hurdle will bar some claims when, as in Wil-
son, the culpable state of mind of the official cannot be proved."4 s
Justice Stevens, in his Hudson concurrence, argued that the less de-
manding standard of" 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' should
be applied" when the riotous circumstances of Whitley are not present.1 49
Supporting this proposition, Justice Stevens cited Unwin v. Campbell,150
a First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, as a pertinent example of why
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain test is more appropriate for
excessive force cases in non-riotous situations than the one advocated by
the Hudson majority.1 51 In Unwin, a prisoner who was an innocent by-
145. See id. at 313; see also Thomas Barth, Perception and Acceptance of Supreme
Court Decisions at the State and Local Level, 17 J. PUB. L. 308, 314 (1968) ("A five-four
vote is likely to increase the opportunity for attack upon the decision. Such a vote indicates
a difference of opinion on the Court itself; if experts cannot agree on questions of law, it is
reasonable to assume others will also disagree.").
146. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
147. The Court's analysis of Hudson's beating and whether the guard's conduct satisfied
the malicious and sadistic requirement is sparse. Thus, one is left to assume that any unjus-
tified physical force, short of de minimus uses of physical force, which may be considered
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind" will meet the burden. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000
(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
148. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991).
149. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). One commentator has agreed with Justice Stevens' approach. See Neis-
ser, supra note 126, at 21. The unnecessary and wanton standard was also the test sup-
ported by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Whitley. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
150. 863 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988).
151. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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stander to a fight between two other prisoners was beaten by state troop-
ers who rushed into a day room to quell the disturbance.152 The troopers
argued that their efforts were a good faith attempt to subdue the prison-
ers.15 s The troopers were not given the benefit of the Whitley test because
the court found that the "previous disturbance may have subsided by the
time the law enforcement officials arrived at the prison."' 54 However,
under Hudson, the plaintiff in Unwin would have had to prove that the
troopers acted with malicious and sadistic intent, which he probably
could not have done because of the troopers' claim that they acted in
good faith to quell the disturbance. Thus, there is a window of opportu-
nity for prison officials who are charged with using excessive force. In the
future, prison officials who can demonstrate that they acted in good faith,
despite acting maliciously and sadistically with the intent to inflict harm,
will be protected under Hudson.
While Justice Thomas' dissent seems extreme, it is noteworthy since it
reveals inconsistencies in the majority's opinion.155 Thomas noted that
the Court ignored precedent when it adopted Estelle's contemporary
standards of decency as the appropriate yardstick when measuring the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment test.5 6 He is partially
correct in revealing the Court's break with precedent concerning the ob-
jective component of the Eighth Amendment.257 The precedent upon
which Thomas primarily relies is Estelle, Rhodes and Wilson, yet all
three of these cases are deprivation cases. Justice Thomas refused to ac-
knowledge the distinction between excessive force cases and prison depri-
vation suits, which won him sharp criticism from Justice O'Connor."5 s Im-
portantly, Thomas noted: "After today, the 'necessity' of a deprivation is
apparently the only relevant inquiry beyond the wantonness of official
conduct."' 5 9 Justice Thomas' observation could prove to be an accurate
forecast for excessive force cases. In situations such as the one in Hudson,
when no constraints face the prison guard, unnecessary violence will be a
152. Unwin, 863 F.2d at 126-27.
153. Id. at 129-30.
154. Id. at 130.
155. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Even the Bush administra-
tion opposed the "serious injury" rule advanced by Justice Thomas. See Linda Greenhouse,
High Court Defines New Limit on Force by a Prison Guard, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 26, 1991, at
Al.
156. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
158. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001 ("To deny, as the dissent does, the difference between
punching a prisoner in the face and serving him unappetizing food is to ignore the 'concepts
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' that animate the Eighth
Amendment.").
159. Id. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Whether or not something is wanton "depends
upon the constraints facing the official." Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 27:151
HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN
violation of a prisoner's fundamental rights. However, as noted above,
when an official uses excessive force mistakenly, but in good faith, that
official will be protected by Hudson.
Finally, the Hudson case provided the general public with its first
glimpse of Justice Thomas' interpretive approach to the Constitution
while on the Supreme Court. Although Thomas' greatest criticism of the
majority centers around its abandonment of the serious injury require-
ment, he does spend a significant amount of time retracing the history of
the Eighth Amendment in order to show that the Eighth Amendment
historically did not protect prisoners, such as Keith Hudson, during in-
carceration.'6 0 From language such as "[w]hen we cut the Eighth Amend-
ment loose from its historical mooring and applied it to a broad range of
prison deprivations . .,"e6 it is apparent that Thomas does not approve
of the Eighth Amendment's modern applications. Thomas' originalist
perspective shows disdain for the Court's slogan of "contemporaneous
standards of decency." In fact, Thomas' desire to maintain the serious
injury requirement has drawn the wrath of one commentator, who called
his views "frightening.' 16 2 As an originalist in theory, Thomas' vote in
Hudson is not surprising, yet what is shocking is his vigorous dissent in a
case where the rights of an insular, discreet minority are at stake. Many
believed that Thomas would strive to protect such rights, particularly af-
ter testifying during his confirmation hearings that almost every day he
watched from his District of Columbia office as Afro-American prisoners
were bussed to prison and said to himself "but for the grace of God, there
go I. ' 163 In light of his dissent, one must wonder if Justice Thomas now
chooses to ignore this image.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment, while it purports to condemn "cruel and un-
usual punishment," has a rather poor history of doing just that. The Su-
preme Court undertook efforts to change the scope of the Amendment
during the 1970s, and while Estelle and Rhodes were groundbreaking
cases, it is questionable whether prisoners' rights were actually expanded.
Whatever hopes prisoners had were quickly diminished by Whitley and
Wilson, which set high burdens of proof for prisoners alleging that their
constitutional rights had been violated.
In lieu of the Court's past treatment of Eighth Amendment claims,
Hudson v. McMillian is a significant victory for prisoners' rights. The
elimination of the serious injury requirement abolishes an inhumane, out-
160. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162. Neisser, supra note 126, at 21.
163. Greenhouse, supra note 155, at Al.
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dated and confusing rule. As is evidenced by Candelaria, the objective
component of the test will now focus on what is and what is not de
minimis injury. Injuries, such as those sustained by Keith Hudson, clearly
are not de minimis and will receive full protection under the Eighth
Amendment.
While the application of the subjective malicious and sadistic test cre-
ated in Whitley is flawed, it should not adversely affect many prisoners'
rights cases, since the intent element does not now appear to be too high
of a hurdle. Nevertheless, in situations such as Hudson's, where force was
unnecessary to begin with, the intent of the prison official is really irrele-
vant. The test that should have been applied, as Justice Stevens argued,
was the deliberate indifference test. However, with the malicious and sa-
distic test in place, prisoners may have difficulty prevailing in excessive
force claims when prison officials argue that they acted in good faith.
. Despite this, Hudson is a significant step away from the "hands-off"
doctrine that appeared to be coming back into vogue with the Whitley
and Wilson decisions. Hudson also indicates that the Rehnquist Court,
no matter how rigidly it relies on precedent, may be willing to comply
with contemporary standards of decency. The Court seems to remember,
as one commentator has noted:
Prisoners are the starkest form of a "discrete and insular minority" - de-
spised and politically powerless. It is easy to forget them and their problems
- until they are released from prison and prey upon society again. We pro-
ceed at our own peril if we forget Dostoyesky's warning that: "The degree of
civilization in a society is revealed by entering its prisons."'"
L. Allan Parrott, Jr.
164. Neisser, supra note 126, at 21, 25 (citation omitted).
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